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CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF KINGS: HOUSING PART R

-----------------------------------------------------------------X
1020-45 Realty Corp.,
Petitioner-Landlord,

L&T Index No. 51216/20
-against-

DECISION/ORDER'.
Luis Melendez;
Olga Albino, et al.
Respondent-Tenant.

-----------------------------------------------------------------X
Zhuo Wa111g, J.:
Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the mview of
respondent's motion for summary judgment and petitioner's cross-motion.
Papers
Numbered
Notice of Motion and Affidavits Annexed .................
Affirmation in Opposition, and
Affidavits J\nnexed ..............................................................
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In this nonpayment proceeding, Petitioner sought to recover alleged rental~ arrears
for the prnmises located at 1020 45th Street, Apt 4G, Brooklyn, NY pursuant to a rentstabilized l1ease. Respondents filed a prose answer asserting general denial.
The proceeding first appeared on the court's calendar on January 21·, 2020.
Respondenits subsequently retained Mobilization for Justice as counsel and, on March 13,
2020, prior to the COVID-19 emergency shutdown, Respondents moved the court for
leave to amend their pro se answer to include, among others, defenses of improper
service, bmach of warranty of habitability, and several counterclaims. Respondents'

motion was granted on July 22, 2020, and their proposed Amended Answer attached to
their motion was deemed served and filed.
On J~ugust 11, 2020, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss based on improper
service of the rent demand and lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was
granted on October 9, 2020 only to the extent of setting this matter down for a traverse
hearing om service of the rent demand and the notice of petition and petition. This
proceedin9 was set down for a traverse hearing in this trial part on December 9, 2020.
Respondents' filed the instant motion on November 9, 2020, seeking leave, for the
second time, to serve and file an amended answer pursuant to CPLR §3025(b). The

\

proposed amended answer contains a defense under Tenant Safe Harbor Act ("THSA"),
which was signed into law on June 30, 2020, asserting that Respondent suffered financial
hardship rnsulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. Respondents argue that leave to amend
pleadings should be freely given absent significant prejudice to the othe?r side.
Respondents also assert that since there was a recent ·change in the law enaieted to
ameliorate instance of financial hardship such as instant case. Respondents argue that

\

\

there is no unfair surprise to Petitioner since Petitioner was aware of the pmposed
defense, which was discussed at a conference on October 21, 2020, but that in any case,
unfair surp1rise is only found in extreme situations, such as when a movant delayed for
years. Respondents also assert that during the pendency of the motion to dismiss, they
informed Petitioner of their intent to move to amend their answer to include a defense

\
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under TSHA. In any event, Respondents argue that on this type of motion to amEmd, the
court need not test the validity of the proposed defense, and that it should only be denied
where the: proposed amendment is insufficient as a matter of law and is totally de!void of
merit.
Petitioner argues that it would be unduly prejudicial for Respondents to submit an
amended answer at this juncture in the litigation in a trial ready case, where Respondents
were awa1re of the defense for several months and filed the instant motion to amend
. shortly prior to the commencement of the trial. Petitioner argues that this appears to be
a "conscia1us and strategic decision to delay this matter as long as possible." Petitioner
also argues that no corroborating evidence has been offered in support of Respondents'
proposed defense and casts doubts on Respondents' claims that they suffered financial
hardship as the result of loss of income (Respondent Melendez allegedly formerly drove
for Uber to support his family, which he contends was no longer profitable after the
emergency shutdown) and directly due to Respondents and their children contracting the
COVID-19 virus.
CPLR § 3025 provides that leave to amend pleadings shall be freely grantE~d. The
Court of Appeals has held that "[l]eave to amend the pleadings 'shall be freely given'
absent prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay," [Fahey v County of Ontario,
44 NY2d 9:14, 935 (1978)]. Additionally, "[p]rejudice ... is not found in the mere exlPosure
of the defendant to greater liability. Instead, there must be some indication that the

3

defendant has been hindered in the preparation of his case or ha.s been prevented from
taking some measure in support of his position," [Loomis v Civetta Corinna Constr. Corp..
54 NY2d 18, 23 (1981) (citations omitted)]. Moreover, mere delay is not enough to
constitute prejudice [see. e.g. Godel! v Greyhound Rent A Car. Inc.. 24 AD2d 568 (2d Dept
1965)].
Petitioner cites to Boyd v Trent 297 AD2d 301, 303 [2d Dept 2002) for the
proposition that "[c]ourts should determine 'how long the amending party was aware of
the facts upon which the mo~ion' is based ... [and] when a party's delay is at issue, the
movant must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the delay and provide an affidavit of
merit."
Boyd is factually distinguishable from the case at bar. First, in Boyd. plaintiffs waited
10 years to serve an amended complaint rather than the four mere months it took
Respondents in the instant case to move to interpose a defense based on the recently
passed TSHA Moreover, assuming Boyd applies to the case at bar because this is a trialready matter, Respondents have asserted a reasonable excuse despite their possible
awareness of the facts surrounding this defense since March; namely, the defense was not
available to them until the law was passed in late June. Lastly, under Boyd. Respondents
have established that the proposed amendment is meritorious. Namely, Respondents
have provided affidavits describing the effects the COVID-19 emergency has had on their
finances and their health, as well as the hea lth of their children. Respondent Melendez
1
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detailed his difficulties, as the sole provider for the family of five, to continue to earn a
living as an Uber driver during the pandemic, which ultimately resulted in him having to
find work in construction, where work opportunities are inconsistent and pay significantly
less than he was earning previously. Respondents also stated that the entire family
contracted COVID-19 and that it took several weeks to recover from the virus.
Furthermore, Petitioner does not dispute Respondents assertion that Respondents
informed Petitioner of their intent to amend the answer while the prior motion to dismiss
was subJudice or that the amendment was discussed at a prior conference with the court.
Thus, Petitioner cannot claim to have been surprised by the amendment. Petitioner will
not be hindered in the preparation of hi.s case or prevented from taking some measure in
support of his position since the defense Respondent seeks to interpose places no
additional burden on Petitioner to prove its case. Under the TSHA, it is Respondents
burden to prove the defense: Furthermore, the TSHA does not relieve Respondents from
paying the alleged rental arrears that accrued during the covered period. Petitioner can
still obtain a money judgment for the amount owed during that period, if it can prove its
entitlement to such. Petitioner can also still maintain a claim for a possessory judgment
for any amount that accrued prior to the covered period.
Accordingly, Respondents' motion is granted to the extent that Respondents'
Second Amended Answer, attached as "Exhibit A" to the motion, is deemed served and
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filed. This proceeding will appear on the Part R calendar on December 8, 2020 at 9:30AM

for a virtual traverse hearing.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: December 7, 2020

ENTER:

~. 1.tnso 6~£nl9
Judg~. ~?Jeia~ C~t!rl
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